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Not long ago a well-informed scholar of Soviet law observed: "It is
somewhat startling how little we know of the Soviet advocate, that species
of Soviet jurist who seems most proximate in function to the western
private practitioner .... [P]aradoxically we are not even sure how many
advocates there are in the Soviet Union."l Although the profession of a
Soviet advocate is no longer the enigma that it used to be, some funda-
mental issues as well as intricate details of the Soviet advocate's practice
remain obscure and deserve more extensive treatment. In fact, even the
precise number of advocates in the USSR is still unknown. 2
The primary purpose of this article is to describe the way in which the
Soviet Bar Association is organized and functions and to define the po-
sition that it occupies vis-A-vis other Soviet institutions. Although an
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1. Butler, Some Reflections on the Soviet Advokatura: Its Structure and Prospects, in
SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN 239 (Law in Eastern Europe series, vol. 20, 1979).
2. Recent Soviet sources quote the number of advocates in the country from as low as
18,000, see, e.g., THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE USSR 39 (1979), to as high as
23,000, see, e.g., Povysheniye Roli Advokatury v Okazanii Pomoshchi Grazhdanam, 2,
SOVETSKOYE GosUDARSTVO I PRAVO [Sov. Gos. & PRAVOI 93 (1985), (comments by Suk-
harev, Counsel to the Advokatura Department at the Ministry of Justice of the USSR).
Interim figures are also often cited.
854 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
adequate exposition of this subject requires some recounting of infor-
mation already available, 3 an attempt has been made to fill in the gaps in
existing scholarship and to clarify some of the remaining ambiguities which
are inevitable in a study of any Soviet institution. The article does not
deal directly with either the procedural aspects of the Soviet advocate's
work or with the political constraints imposed on their substantive per-
formance. Both of these topics are discussed insofar as they help to
highlight the role of advocates in Soviet society.4
I. The Strange Case of Advocates in the USSR
Even at first glance, the continuing existence of advocates in the Soviet
Union is perplexing. Just recently a respected Soviet legal periodical
carried an article by a history professor who quoted from the famous
words of Lenin: "One must rule the advocate with an iron hand and keep
him in a state of siege, for this intellectual scum often plays dirty." 5 The
author observed that in reality Russian advocates "played dirty" more
often in the twentieth century, when the proletariat advanced to the po-
sition of vanguard of the rev'olution and thus threatened the well being of
the bourgeoisie. 6 Such comments in a Soviet journal hardly offend many
readers and apparently easily pass the censorship of the editors because
the status of an advocate in the USSR generates mistrust and suspicion
of both the government and its subjects.
An advocate in the Soviet Union is endowed with certain prerogatives
and duties which must inevitably create almost universal animosity toward
the bar in the Soviet society. The officialdom must see the advocate as
potentially the most dangerous opponent, because he possesses a legal
right to oppose the system in a courtroom. Moreover, the system has
provided him with the unique privilege of speaking to an audience without
prior scrutiny. This freedom of expression itself may be seen as a sub-
3. See, e.g., Huskey, The Limits to Institutional Autonomy in the Soviet Union: The Case
of the Advokatura, 34 SOVIET STUDIES 200 (1982) [hereinafter Advokatura]; D. KAMIN-
SKAYA, FINAL JUDGMENT, MY LIFE AS A SOVIET DEFENSE ATTORNEY (1982).
4. For background reading on the profession of an advocate in the USSR see, e.g., Barry
& Berman, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1968); Zile, Soviet Advokatura
Twenty Five Years After Stalin, in SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN, supra note 1, at 207.
5. See Troitski, Korifei Russkoi Advokatury Pervogo Prizyva, 2 Sov. Gos. & PRAVO 120
(1985) (quoting V. Lenin, Pismo E. D. Stasovoi i Tovarishcham v Moskovskoi Tyurme, 9
POLNOYE SOBRANIYE SOCHINENII 171). The author omitted the closing lines of Lenin's
statement: "Announce to him ahead of time: if you, son of a bitch, allow yourself even the
slightest indiscretion or political opportunism, then I, the accused, will at once separate
myself from you publicly, label you a scoundrel, and state that I reject such a defense." Id.
Lenin, himself a lawyer, is also known to have adverted to advocates' talent for fabricating
false arguments and throwing sand into the people's eyes.
6. Troitski, supra note 5, at 120.
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versive anachronism in a regime that has monopolized the supply of in-
formation, education, and ideology. The right to address the public is
coupled with the legally protected privilege/duty of confidentiality of com-
munications with clients. In the absence of clergy and private psychia-
trists, an advocate in the Soviet Union is the only individual with whom
(ideally) a citizen may consult without fear that his secrets will be exposed
to the authorities. Neither of these fundamental rights of an advocate fits
neatly into the standard image of Soviet society.
The advocate's position as a champion of individual rights has not
earned him the respect and support of his fellow countrymen. The public
generally envies advocates for their considerably higher than average
wages and opportunities to receive side income. The apparent separation
of the bar from the state apparatus also alienates advocates from the
masses, who view them as a foreign element in a country of pervasive
government controls. Finally, until recently the predominantly Jewish
looks and names of advocates 7 further raised the barrier between the
profession and its potential clients.
It should be of no surprise, then, that as a Soviet lawyer recently
admitted: "It is hard to remember an instance when an advocate was
portrayed in a newspaper article or on the television screen not as a
blowhard and a sharpie fencing off a criminal, but as a wise specialist of
strong patriotism." 8 In this unfriendly environment an advocate today
finds himself squeezed between the state's need to restrict his indepen-
dence and the populace's desire to minimize his privileges.
II. The Status of the Soviet Bar
In 1977 the Soviet bar was raised to the level of a constitutional agency
whose fundamentals are provided for in Article 161 of the Soviet Con-
stitution: "Colleges of advocates are available to give legal assistance to
citizens and organizations. In cases provided for by legislation citizens
shall be given legal assistance free of charge. The organization and pro-
cedure of the Bar are determined by the legislatures of the USSR and
7. Huskey observed that "a disproportionally high percentage of the membership [in the
bar] is Jewish. The Jewish component of the Moscow City College of Advocates is estimated
at well over 50%." See Advokatura, supra note 3, at 202. Huskey concluded that "the
advokatura continues to function as a refuge for Jewish lawyers unable to enter freely state
legal institutions because of officially imposed restrictions." Id. The latter assertion seems
to be inaccurate, since from the mid 1970s the very same restrictions apply to admission
of new members to the bar.
8. See Povysheniye Roli Advokatury v Okazani Pomoshchi Grazhdanam, supra note 2,
at 86 (comments by Savitsky, member of the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of
Science of the USSR).
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Union republics." 9 As stated in the Constitution, the bar is subject to the
statutory commands of an all-union law and respective republican regu-
lations (polozheniya). In November 1979, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
passed the first Law on the Bar of the USSR.10 The 1979 law provided
general outlines for the institutional organization of the advocate profession.
The Soviet bar is composed of associations of advocates-"colleges"--
which are independent from each other and are structured on the principle
of territoriality. Republican colleges of advocates are formed in Union
Republics without regional division and in Autonomous Republics; ter-
ritorial and regional colleges in corresponding administrative units of the
country; and city colleges in some of the largest cities.'' Thus, several
colleges of advocates, without any formal links to each other, may be set
up on the territory of one Union Republic. For example, on the territory
of RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) one will find
city colleges, regional colleges, and colleges of advocates of Autonomous
Republics. There is no subordination of one college to another, nor is
there a single ruling body supervising the work of all advocates in the
Republic. The every day work of a college is conducted by its member-
advocates through so-called offices of legal consultation formed by each
college. 12
The Law of the Bar defines colleges of advocates as "voluntary asso-
ciations of persons practicing as advocates."1 3 Despite this terse defini-
tion, both in the Soviet Union and abroad the bar has come to be known
by its more sententious description as a social, self-governing,' 4 and vol-
untary organization. ' 5 A close look at the status of the Soviet bar reveals
that none of these epithets is accurate. 16
9. KONST. SSSR art. 161.
10. See LAW OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE BAR OF THE
USSR, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF THE USSR 330 (1981), (hereinafter THE LAW).
Before the passage of this fundamental law, there was no uniform legislation regulating the
profession of an advocate as a whole; each union republic adopted its own statute regulating
activities of advocates within its respective jurisdiction.
11. Id. art. 3.
12. Id. art. 8.
13. Id. art. 3.
14. The Russian word "obshchestvennaya" is sometimes translated as "public;" in this
context "'social" seems to be a more accurate English equivalent. Similarly, the word
"'samoupravlyayushchayasya" means "self-governing," but sometimes is translated as "self-
administering." The choice of terms is not crucial for the understanding of the concepts
involved.
15. See, e.g., SUo I SUDOPROIZVODSTVO V SSSR (1984). This recent Soviet textbook
for law students gives the following definition of the Soviet Bar: "'Advokatura-is a social,
self-governing organization, which is called upon to render to the population and organi-
zations juridical assistance on legal issues, draft all sorts of documents and business papers,
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A. Is THE BAR VOLUNTARY?
The voluntary nature of the Soviet bar is its only property expressly
mentioned in the law. 17 It is usually associated with the process of creating
new colleges of advocates.' 8 According to the all-union and republican
legislation, "colleges of advocates shall be set up on application by a
group of constituents consisting of persons with a higher law education." 19
The statutes, however, provide for an alternative method of establishing
a college of advocates-"initiative of the executive and administrative
organ of a corresponding Soviet of People's Deputies." 20 No statistical
data exist on how many colleges were started by volunteers in recent
decades, but in all probability the number is minuscule, or zero. In any
event, even if a group of jurists decides to organize themselves into a
college, they must forward their application to the Republican Ministry
of Justice, which in turn, if it consents, will send it to the Council of
Ministers or a corresponding territorial executive committee of the Peo-
ple's Soviet for approval. 2' It is evident that the right to "voluntarily"
organize a college of advocates depends totally on the bureaucracy of the
state apparatus and probably is never exercised anyway. Thus the defi-
nition of colleges of advocates as "voluntary associations" is deceptive
and meaningless since in practice it does not distinguish the bar from any
other Soviet institution. In fact, even in the Soviet Union this term has
become a legal fiction, whose substance is not usually discussed in the
literature.
B. Is THE BAR A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION?
The description of the Soviet bar as a social organization has become
a custom observed in almost every piece of writing on this subject. 22 Yet,
despite this almost universal definition of the bar as a Soviet social or-
conduct court defense in criminal cases, and representation in civil cases." Id. at 259
(emphasis added).
16. In this respect it is hard to resist a comparison of the definition of the Soviet bar with
the popular description of the Holy Roman Empire.
17. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., SUD I SUDOPROIZVODSTVO V SSSR 240 (1981).
19. See THE LAW, supra note 10 at art. 3; RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR art. 3,
reprinted in VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR 1105 (1980) [hereinafter the RSFSR
REGULATION ON THE BAR].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Apraksin & Polyak, Razvitiye Sovetskoi Advokatury, 5 Sov. Gos. & Pravo
99 (1979); The Criminal Justice System of the Soviet Union, supra note 2, at 39; Advokatura,
supra note 3, at 200.
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ganization, 23 legally it does not carry this status. 24 Some western scholars,
even those who continue to call the bar a social organization have noted,
on the advice of their Soviet colleagues, that colleges of advocates, unlike
other Soviet social organizations, are not subject to the state income tax. 25
The exemption from taxation, however, does not explain why the Soviet
government is reluctant to formally extend the status of social organization
to the bar.26
The critical fact is that the status of social organization accords the
republican organs of such a body a privilege of legislative initiative 27 which
is denied to the bar. There are two primary reasons for the government's
unwillingness to grant this right to advocates. First, only the republican
organs of a social organization have the right of legislative initiative.
Consequently, since colleges of advocates on the level of a Union Republic
exist in less than half of the Soviet Union Republics, the extension of the
status of social organization to all colleges will discriminate against those
that have no governing bodies at the level of a Union Republic. 28
Second, had the government really wanted to give the bar full rights of
social organization, the situation could have been easily remedied, for
example, by creating an all-union organ to represent the common interests
of all advocates. Such a body would also have enjoyed the prerogative
to initiate legislation. 29 A denial of the status of social organization and,
therefore, of the right to initiate legislation enables the government to
maintain a disheartening situation in which "the impact of the profession
on the law-making process is marginal at best. In the case of the 1979
Law on the Advocatura, the advocates had no direct influence on the
initiation or drafting of the legislation." 30 In order to continue this practice
of excluding advocates from the law making process, which apparently
23. Admittedly some Soviet authors writing about social organizations in the Soviet Union
in general do not mention the bar as one of them. See, e.g., Ts. Yampolskaya, SOCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE USSR (1972).
24. In common usage the word "social" is appropriate to indicate that advocates are not
state employees and do not receive their salaries from the state.
25. See Advokatura, supra note 3: "Although the advokatura satisfies all requirements
of a social organization, a Ministry of Justice official explained that it was not so described
in legislation because it would have subjected the profession to an unnecessary tax liability."
Id.: see also W. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 78 (1983 ed.).
26. There is nothing complicated in granting an exemption from taxation to an agency
which otherwise is recognized in law as a social organization.
27. See, e.g., KONST. RSFSR art. 108.
28. For the official Soviet view on this issue see Natruskin, Novyi Zakon ob Advokature
v SSSR, 10 Sov. Gos. & PRAVO 20 (1980) (Natruskin is the head of the Advokatura De-
partment of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR.).
29. KONST. USSR art. 113.
30. Advokatura, supra note 3, at 206.
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satisfies the interests of the ruling elite, the government will avoid by all
means a legal recognition of the bar as a social organization. 31
C. Do ADVOCATES GOVERN THEMSELVES?
No Soviet law mentions the words "self-governing" when talking about
the bar. Yet this term, like "social," has acquired a permanent presence
in the Soviet bar lexicon. 32 Soviet advocates, perhaps like their western
counterparts, justifiably consider that "the self-governance of the bar is
a necessary condition of its normal work." 33 Soviet juridical literature
usually explains that the essence of the "principle of self-governance is
the advocate's right to decide independently questions relating to the
organization and activities of the college." 34 Western commentators adopt
a similar position: "Unique in the Soviet Union as a self-administering
profession, the advokatura places ultimate responsibility for administrat-
ing the affairs of the profession within the colleges of advocates on the
general meeting, or conference of the college." 35 The validity of these
evaluations is questionable, if only because of the minimal role that ad-
vocates played in writing the law governing their own organization. 36 To
assess accurately the degree to which the bar governs itself, it is useful
first to take a look at the commands of the law, and then to observe how
the law is implemented in practice.
The highest organ of a college of advocates is a general meeting (con-
ference), 37 its executive body is a presidium, and an auditing commission
31. For comparison it should be noted that the ruling bodies of the Procuracy do have
the right to initiate legislation. See LAW OF THE USSR ON THE PROCURATOR'S OFFICE OF
THE USSR art. 9, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF THE USSR, supra note 10, at 303.
32. See, e.g., Advokatura, supra note 3, at 200; THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE
USSR, supra note 2, at 39.
33. Stetsovsky, Distsiplinarnaya Otvetstvennost Advokatov, 5 Soy. Gos. & PRAVO 105
(1979).
34. Suo I SUDOPROIZVODSTVO V SSSR, supra note 18, at 241.
35. W. BUTLER, supra note 25, at 79.
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Huskey also correctly points out that the
regulation of the bar by laws promulgated by the state legislature sets it apart from social
organizations which are governed by rules adopted at the congresses of these organizations
and are not subject to confirmation by state authorities. See Advokatura, supra note 3, at
222 n.39.
37. THE LAW, supra note 10, art. 4. If a college of advocates comprises more than three
hundred members, a conference may be convened instead of a general meeting. The del-
egates to the conference are elected at each legal consultation office according to the ratio
set by the college presidium. See, e.g., RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra note 19,
art. 5. The intervention by the state or party organs into the process of electing delegates
to the conference is usually limited to the assurance that all officers and party members at
each legal consultation office are chosen as delegates. Since the same rules apply to general
meetings and conferences, all future references are made only to general meetings.
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is its control and auditing organ. The general meeting or conference of
the college is convened at least once a year on the initiative of either the
college presidium, one third of the member-advocates, or the authorized
state organs. 38
The agenda of the annual general meetings usually includes reports by
the presidium members about the activities of the college, exchange of
information and experience with the visiting advocates from other col-
leges, and often speeches by the invited representatives of state and party
organizations about their supervision of and cooperation with advocates.
In addition, discussions are frequently conducted on the various topics
of interest to the lawyers present. In agreement with republican regula-
tions on the bar, the general meeting is authorized to decide by a majority
vote all questions affecting the governance of the college. 39
This seemingly democratic assembly of the general meeting and liberal
delegation of powers over the management of the college to its members
camouflages the impotence of the general meeting to make any indepen-
dent decisions. In practice, long in advance of the general meeting its
agenda is discussed in detail and drawn up at the meetings between the
chairman of the college presidium and local state and party organs.40 In
addition, more important questions decided at the general meeting-those
affecting the size, the personnel, and the future income and expenses of
the college-are not finalized until the approval by the corresponding
executive committee of the local Soviet of People's Deputies. 41 Finally,
in the event that the general meeting deviates from the prescribed posture
resulting in "disparity between effective legislation and a decision of the
general meeting (conference), the Ministry of Justice may stay its
operation."42
38. RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra note 19, art. 5 provides that the general
meeting (conference) can be called at the initiative of the presidium of the college, the
suggestion of the Ministry of Justice, juridical section of the executive committee of the
local Soviet of People's Deputies, or at the request of one third of the members of the
college.
39. See, e.g., RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra note 19, art. 6.
40. These preliminary consultations may often be very strained. For example, one of the
topics often discussed at the general meeting of a college is the nature of the relationship
between an advocate and his client. Since the party and the profession often hold competing
views on this subject--e.g., could an advocate pursue the defense of his client if he is aware
of the latter's guilt-consensus is often hard to reach.
41. RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra note 19, art. 6. For example, the size of
the Moscow City College of Advocates has not grown for the last thirty years despite
numerous requests to increase its membership by thirty advocates. The denial has resulted
in limitations on business trips and on the number of out-of-city clients that an advocate
may receive. It is curious to note that in many instances the decision to change the size of
a college of advocates is held up not by the local Soviet, under whose jurisdiction it belongs,
but rather by the Ministry of Justice. See Sukharev, supra note 2, at 93.
42. See THE LAW, supra note 10, art. 16; RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra note
19, art. 35.
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Once in three years a general meeting convenes to exercise its most
important function-to select the presidium and the auditing commission
of the college. The election of the ruling bodies of the college by its rank
and file members casting secret ballots 43 is usually presented as the cor-
nerstone in the foundation of the bar's self-governance. This ostensibly
democratic, even by western standards, method of selecting the elite of
the college is, in practice, just a screen concealing a process by which
the roster of the presidium and auditing commission44 members is ulti-
mately determined by the Communist Party apparatus.
The initial list of advocates to be suggested for the membership in the
presidium is a product of negotiations between the current chairman of
the college presidium and the appropriate official of the local party or-
ganization. 45 This list of potential candidates is presented for discussion
and approval to the party caucus of the college on the day of the general
meeting before the actual elections begin. This meeting of the party group
is usually chaired by the party representative, 46 who instructs members
of the party on their voting behavior and recommends advocates who
should be nominated for the presidium. The party list is finalized by an
open vote which usually coincides with the original party proposal. At
the end of the gathering, one of the advocates is authorized to nominate
the agreed-upon candidates at the general meeting; the representative of
the party group always is given the first right of nomination. Following
the dispersion of the party group, the discussion of the candidates with
nonparty members may take place in different formats.
In Moscow, for example, an informal meeting between the party group
and the rest of the college occurs before the voting process starts. In the
course of this discussion the two groups may come to a new consensus-
excluding few of the candidates on the party list and adding new nomi-
nees-in which case an updated list is proposed at the general meeting.
Obviously most of the candidates on this final slate should be elected to
the presidium, because they have the prior support of a majority of the
college members. 47
43. THE LAW, supra note 10, art. 7. Before 1979 these elections were held in secret only
in Estonia and RSFSR. See APRAKSIN & POLYAK, supra note 22, at 100 n.6.
44. There is no need to separately describe the election of the auditing commission
members because it is essentially the same as the election of the members of the presidium.
45. As a general rule this party official is a member of The Department of Administrative
Organs. This party organ consists of the head of the department, his deputy, and a number
of instructors. The Department of Administrative Organs is a division in the secretariat of
the local party organization which oversees and supervises the work of the KGB, MVD,
Procuracy, Ministry of Justice, and the bar at the corresponding territorial level.
46. In Moscow the meeting is apparently chaired by the "head of the Administrative
Division." See D. KAMINSKAYA, supra note 3, at 26.
47. This account is based on the description by D. Kaminskaya and E. Haskey, who
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Other colleges may follow a slightly different order. In Estonia, for
example, no informal discussion takes place before the general meeting
reconvenes. At the general meeting the party group representative nom-
inates the candidates selected by the party and a general formal discussion
follows. Since the nomination of candidates is open to everyone, two or
three advocates may be proposed spontaneously by the audience. An
advocate may cast his vote for any candidate, although party members
are constrained by party discipline to vote for their original list. This
process seems to be more democratic, since it involves a genuine dis-
cussion of candidates at the general meeting rather than a give-and-take
bargaining resulting in the nomination of predetermined candidates at the
general meeting.48 Nevertheless, both procedures of choosing the gov-
erning bodies of the college are tainted by external interference and can
hardly be regarded as a free expression of the advocates' will. Yet while
the culmination of the elections in a secret ballot may at least create the
appearance of independence, the actual governance of the college-the
work of the presidium itself-is devoid of any pretense of autonomy.
The presidium of the college of advocates is vested with broad powers
enabling it to shape the character of the college and to manage its day-
to-day activities. The numerical composition of the presidium is deter-
mined by the general meeting, but as a rule ranges from nine to twelve
advocates. The presidium is headed by a chairman and usually one vice-
chairman, though sometimes two. These officers are elected by an open
vote to ensure the selection of the members designated by the party. The
elected bureaucrats receive a salary from the funds of the college 49 and
spend most of their time administering its affairs. 50
The law provides that the official responsibilities of the chairman and
vice-chairman of the presidium include such mundane duties as con-
ducting the work of the presidium, reviewing complaints and recommen-
dations submitted to the presidium, and maintaining control over the
fulfillment of the general meeting decisions. 5 ' One of the main functions
interviewed her on this issue. See D. KAMINSKAYA, supra note 3, at 26; Advokatura, supra
note 3, at 208.
48. In addition to the Law on the Bar, the election of the governing bodies of colleges of
advocates is controlled by the regulations adopted by the Ministry of Justice of the USSR.
See Natruskin, Zakon ob Advokature v Deistvii, 7 SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST [SoTs.
ZAK!] 22 (1981).
49. RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra note 19, art. 21.
50. Neither the chairman nor the vice-chairman of the presidium is prohibited from en-
gaging in the practice of law, see, e.g., RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra note 19,
art. 21, but usually both of them are too overwhelmed with administrative duties to see
clients. Other members of the presidium do not receive any remuneration from the college
for their services and their salary, like that of any rank and file member of the college,
depends solely on the amount of legal work they do.
51. See, e.g., RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra note 19, art. 8.
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of the presidium officers, which is not specified in the law, is to serve as
liaisons between the college and the party and state organs. This role is
of primary importance to both sides. Advocates of the college hope that
their elected representatives will use their position to safeguard the in-
terests of the profession. The authorities, counting on their patronage
extended in the nomination process, rely on the cooperation of these
officers in exercising control over the college.
Because of the dual loyalties of the members of the college presidium
and its leadership, the state apparatus subjects their work to additional
scrutiny. A representative of the Advocatura Department of the Ministry
of Justice or of a juridical section of the executive committee of the local
Soviet of People's Deputies attends every meeting of the presidium. This
watchdog does not take part in the work of the presidium, nor does he
vote. Yet he expresses his, and therefore the state's, opinion on every
issue discussed and his participation is reflected in the minutes of the
meetings. Through this routine and immediate supervision over the work
of the presidium, the government ensures the implementation of its pol-
icies by the colleges and exercises control over the advocates.
Despite the preliminary screening of presidium members and regular
supervision over their work, most presidium decisions are subject to con-
firmation by the party or state bodies. For example, the appointment of
a head of a legal consultation office, who has purely nominal responsi-
bilities, requires approval by the Ministry of Justice or a juridical section
of the executive committee of the local Soviet. 52 In addition, appointment
of a head of a consultation office must be approved by the organs of the
local party organization. A rejection by the presidium to admit a new
member may be appealed by this individual to the Council of Ministers
or to the executive committee of the Soviet of People's Deputies which
can stay the decision and require its review by the presidium. 53 Such
intervention by the state authorities on behalf of an unsuccessful applicant
usually guarantees revision of an earlier decision by the presidium. A
good illustration of the presidium's helplessness to withstand pressure
from the government is a case recently reported in the Soviet press. 54 In
that case, a judge was forced to resign after he was proved to have grossly
violated his duties by convicting a person whom he had known to be not
guilty. After his resignation this judge applied for a membership in the
local college of advocates, but was rejected. The presidium managed to
successfully oppose the admission of the judge for half a year, until it
52. See, e.g., id.
53. See, e.g., id. art. 12.
54. See Tselnis, Chastnoye Opredeleniye, Kotorogo Ne Bylo, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Jan.
15, 1986, at 14.
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finally had to give up and accepted him. 55 In all fairness it should be
recognized that the presidium's ability to reject unwanted members de-
pends on the extent of support given to such individuals by the govern-
ment. Occasionally, especially in controversial cases, the government may
let the presidium have its way.5 6
A western observer may be surprised to find out that in the opinion of
the government the three-tier screening mechanism (control over the elec-
tion of the presidium, on-site inspection of the work of the presidium,
and approval of the presidium's major decisions) does not adequately
protect its interests vis-A-vis those of a "self-governing" college. Thus
the Law on the Bar of the USSR, as well as all republican regulations on
the bar, reserve to the Ministry of Justice of the USSR, Republican Min-
istries of Justice, and executive committees of the local Soviets of People's
Deputies a right to stay any decision of the presidium "in the event of
[its] disparity [with] the effective legislation." 57 One cannot escape the
conclusion that the "self-governance" of the bar is a fiction with no
practical meaning.
III. Professional Ethics
In addition to an all-embracing control over the governance of colleges
of advocates, political interests of the party and state require constant
supervision over the advocate's professional activities. Two areas of such
intervention, resulting in the violation by advocates of their professional
responsibilities, illustrate the extent of the bar's subordination to the
commands of the elite.
The first area, the so-called "access" (dopusk) system, requiring that
an advocate obtain a permit to participate in "special cases" has been
unveiled to the West in the past.58 Commentators have not yet discussed,
however, the legal effects of the "access" system on the advocate's
professional conduct. A brief description of this aspect of the Soviet
advocate's practice is necessary in order to clarify some of the information
contained in the older sources.
55. Only after this incident was publicized in the press, the Republican Ministry of Justice
was compelled to ask for the expulsion of the former judge from the bar. See Literaturnaya
Gazeta, Apr. 23, 1986, at 11.
56. In some cases when former procurators apply for membership in the Bar, they are
ultimately rejected despite support from the local party and state bodies. This may be due
to the mutual realization that past conflicts with the Advokatura may cause friction when
procurators join it.
57. See, e.g., THE LAW, supra note 10, art 16; RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra
note 19, art. 35.
58. For a background account on the "access" system and the role of advocates in political
trials, see Luryi, The Role of Defense Counsel in Political Trials in the USSR, 7 MAN. L.J.
307 (1977); see also D. KAMINSKAYA, supra note 3, at 31.
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The requirement that an advocate obtain a special permit granting him
the right to participate in a particular trial is not a legal norm and cannot
be found in any official Soviet publication. Yet it is well-known within
the Soviet legal community, and by now abroad, that an advocate needs
a permission to take part in a case where the investigation was carried
out by the organs of the KGB 59 pursuant to its jurisdictional authority to
investigate particular cases enumerated by law.60
If an advocate wishes to have "access" to these "special cases" in-
vestigated by the KGB, he applies for a permit with the presidium of his
college of advocates. 61 On receipt of an application, the presidium pre-
pares letters of recommendation for the advocate and forwards them to
the appropriate office of the KGB. The final decision whether to grant
the "access" is made on an individual basis by a group of officials usually
including, in addition to a KGB member, a procurator or deputy procur-
ator for the corresponding territorial unit, the chairman or deputy chair-
man of the highest court of such territorial unit, and a member of the
Department of Administrative Organs. 62 The number of advocates in the
entire Soviet Union who have "access" is difficult to ascertain, but it
probably does not exceed twenty percent of the profession. 63 Lists of
advocates with "access" are on file in every legal consultation office and
can be obtained from its head by a client who needs an advocate in a
case requiring "access." This system of segregation, excluding about 80
percent of the profession from participation in an entire category of cases, 64
often leads to violations of Soviet legislation.
59. Probably because of this KGB connection laymen usually call these cases "political."
Indeed most of them deal with anti-Soviet activities, contacts with foreigners, or hard
currency transactions.
60. See, e.g., UPK RSFSR art. 126. In some instances a case may be forwarded for an
investigation by the KGB on the orders of the prosecutor's office.
61. It seems that opportunities to secure a permit ad hoc have been restricted since Luryi
mentioned this possibility in 1977. See Luryi, supra note 58, at 308.
62. Kaminskaya notes that "access is always given to members of a college presidium,
to all office heads, and to all secretaries of party bureaus or offices. In addition it is granted
to three or four rank and file advocates in each office." See D. KAMINSKAYA, supra note
3, at 31. This account is not completely accurate, since instances occur in which some of
the listed officers are denied access. This may often happen when compromising facts about
an officer become known during his tenure in office.
63. Kaminskaya and Luryi provide conflicting information on this issue. Thus, Kamin-
skaya believes that 100 to 120 advocates in Moscow have "'access," id., while Luryi thinks
that only 17 to 20 have it in Leningrad. See Luryi, supra note 58, at 307. This disparitiy
cannot be explained simply by the difference in the numbers of advocates in two cities. If
Kaminskaya's formula is accurate, see supra note 62, then more advocates must have been
granted "access" in Leningrad. At the same time, roughly 20% of advocates are given
"access" in Estonia. The most plausible conclusion is that there is no uniform pattern
observed across the country.
64. The impact of the "access" requirement on the advocate's earning potential should
not be overestimated, since it affects a tiny minority of all criminal cases in the USSR.
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The Soviet Constitution provides that "a defendant in a criminal action
is guaranteed the right to legal assistance." 65 Republican Criminal Codes
explain and supplement this constitutional provision: "The advocate has
no right to abandon the defense of an accused once he has accepted it." ,66
This mandate of criminal procedure rules assures the accused that his
defender will not drop the defense in the middle of the case, which requires
an explanation to the court, and thus will not cast suspicion on the position
of the defendant. It has also been interpreted by Soviet lawyers to mean
that "admission by an advocate of the defendant's guilt when the latter
does not confess should be considered to be a violation of professional
responsibility, an obscured form of abandoning the defense, and conse-
quently a gross violation of the right to defense." 67 The trial of Anatoly
Shcharansky, familiar to the western observer, exemplifies how violations
of all of these precepts occur in "a special case."
Professor Fletcher provided a detailed account of the developments in
this notorious case. 68 On the relevant issue he reports that Shcharansky's
relatives "consulted with 20 or 30 Moscow lawyers, none of whom were
willing to take the case if Anatoly maintained his innocence." 69 Fletcher
continues:
The system of security clearances in politically sensitive cases . . . does func-
tion, and this is why the 20 or 30 lawyers consulted by the Shcharansky family
would take the case only if Anatoly pleaded guilty. 70 A lawyer without "a
dopusk" could not appear. A lawyer with "a dopusk" would lose it if he or she
entered a vigorous defense.
7 1
This statement, however, misses the point. An advocate without "a do-
pusk" could not have assumed the defense whether Shcharansky pleaded
guilty or not guilty. For an advocate with "access," the issue was not
whether to "enter a vigorous defense," but rather how to comply with
the legal norm requiring that he insist on the acquittal of the client, because
the latter did not admit his guilt. Any other action on the part of the
advocate would amount to the violation of his professional responsibility,
65. KONST. SSSR art. 158.
66. See, e.g., UPK RSFSR art. 51. This requirement also used to be included in some
old Republican Regulations on the Bar. See, e.g., 1962 REGULATION ON THE BAR OF RSFSR.
The new 1980 regulation does not contain this provision, which could have been excluded
because of the controversy over its implementation.
67. See G. GINSBURG, A. POLYAK & V. SAMSONOV, SOVETSKII ADVOKAT 6 (1968).
68. See Fletcher, Justice Thwarted, Soy. JEWRY L. REV. 3 (1980).
69. Id. at 6.
70. From the standpoint of criminal law, the reference to a guilty plea is not entirely
accurate. Whereas in the United States a guilty plea, without more, results in conviction,
in the Soviet Union an admission of guilt by the defendant is more akin to a confession
which does not obviate the necessity for a full trial.
71. Fletcher, supra note 68, at 6.
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criminal law, and Shcharansky's right to "legal assistance." Naturally,
very few advocates are anxious to preserve professional integrity at the
cost of their careers. Were they to ask for acquittal they could be dis-
barred, if a confrontation with the government ensued, and their "do-
pusk" would almost certainly be withheld. Consequently most advocates
prefer not to participate in such trials at all.
Conflicts between professional ethics and the demands of the political
branches of the government usually occur only in "special cases." An
example of a regular criminal case demonstrates that disagreements be-
tween an advocate and his client on the issue of guilt ordinarily result in
vacating the judgment. 72 Thus, in the case of Zirakishvily and Gugushvily,
the Supreme Court of the USSR reversed the conviction by the Supreme
Court of Georgia on the ground, inter alia, that the defendant's right to
defense was violated when the advocate conceded the guilt of the accused
who did not confess his guilt.73
Another area, not linked to political cases, where the government's
interference in advocates' work results in the compromise of their profes-
sional responsibilities concerns the right to confidentiality. The law re-
quires that "an advocate shall not have the right to divulge information
communicated to him by the principal in connection with the rendering
of legal advice." 74 Ordinarily, when an advocate is discreet in his activ-
ities, the confidentiality principle is observed. Nonetheless, the exclusivity
of professional communications cannot be guaranteed in everyday con-
sulting practice which is conducted through the legal consultation offices.
Every advocate consulting a client must fill out a so-called registration
card. Among other information, an advocate is required to specify the
nature of the problem discussed and the advice given to the client. These
registration cards are submitted for review to the head of the legal con-
sulting office. The cards are held in a special file reserved for each ad-
vocate. Every advocate in the office has access to all files and may in-
discriminately inspect them. Understanding that this practice conflicts
with the requirements of the law, the Moscow City College of Advocates
decided to simplify the content of registration cards making it more dif-
ficult to ascertain the nature of the advocate-client communications from
the face of the cards. The Advokatura Department of the Ministry of
Justice of RSFSR, however, found this innovation inappropriate "because
72. A disagreement between an advocate and his client on the issue of guilt may pose a
problem only when the defendant does not confess. An advocate can always assert his
client's innocence, even if the latter admits his guilt.
73. See 4 BIULLETEN VERKHOVNOGO SUDA SSSR [BULL. VERKH. SUDA. SSSR] 25
(1983).
74. See, e.g., THE LAW, supra note 10, art. 7; RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra
note 19, art. 16.
SUMMER 1987
868 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
it undermined its control over the work of advocates." 75 Once again the
integrity of the profession was undermined for the sake of the state's
ulterior motives.
IV. Compensation of Advocates
Although the system of advocates' remuneration has been previously
described, 76 recent Soviet legislation not yet discussed in legal literature
calls for a fresh look at this subject. The advocate profession is distin-
guished by a method of compensation that is unusual by Soviet standards.
Unlike the majority of the Soviet working people, advocates do not receive
their salary from the state, and its size is determined solely by the amount
of work they do. 77
An advocate's monthly salary is the sum of the payments made by his
clients to the legal consultation office for the assistance rendered by this
advocate. The amount of each payment corresponds to the fee schedule
issued by the Ministry of Justice of the USSR and is obligatory for all
colleges of advocates. 78 Since the government wants to ensure that every
Soviet citizen can afford legal aid, and does not want to overpay the
advocates, the cost of advocates' services is maintained at a very modest
level. For example, a regular oral consultation with an advocate costs one
ruble ($1.30) and a draft of a complicated legal document which requires
preliminary research by the advocate cannot cost more than six rubles
($8.00). To an advocate participating in the preliminary investigation, his
client will pay twenty rubles for the initial two days, and eights rubles a
day thereafter. A day of a criminal trial that lasts less than three days
also costs twenty rubles; each subsequent day will earn an advocate
twelve rubles. 79
Often advocates face considerable obstacles collecting even the fees
specified by the instruction. As a rule, Soviet advocates may be retained
in two ways: by agreement (po soglasheniyu) and by assignment (po
naznacheniyu). More experienced members of the bar with established
clientele handle the majority of their cases after they reach an agreement
with a client. Such agreements are finalized by a registration card 80 which
carries signatures of the advocate, his client, and the head of the legal
75. See Povysheniye Roli Advokatury v Okazanii Pomoshchi Grazhdanam, supra note
2, at 97 (comments by A. Polyak, member of the Moscow City College of Advocates).
76. See Advokatura, supra note 3, at 214-15; D. KAMINSKAYA, supra note 3, at 28-29.
77. See THE LAW, supra note 10, art. 10.
78. See Instruktsiva Ob Opiate Yuridicheskoi Pomoshchi Okazyvayemoi Advokatami
Grazhdanam, Predpriyatiyam, Uchrezhdeniyam i Organizatsiyam, reprinted in 3 SOTS. ZAK.
81 (1978) [hereinafter Instruktsiya].
79. Id.
80. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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consultation office as well as the description of the service to be rendered
and a corresponding legal fee. After the registration card is filled out the
client makes his payment to the legal consultation office. 8 1 On the com-
pletion of the advocate's legal duties the legal consultation office credits
the fee to the advocate's account.
Younger lawyers, and sometimes their more experienced colleagues,
are often assigned to a particular case. These appointments are made by
the head of the legal consultation office, who receives requests from courts
for advocates who are not otherwise engaged on a specified date. When
an advocate participates in a court proceeding by assignment he signs no
agreement with a client, although a registration card is filled out, and
receives no compensation after the trial ends. Instead, at the completion
of the trial, when the judgment is pronounced, the court exacts from the
defendant a fee in favor of the legal consultation office that provided the
advocate. 82 The consultation office will now receive monthly installment
payments, deducted from the defendant's earnings, which are credited to
the advocate's account. Naturally, Soviet advocates often complain that
this mode of payment results in inadequate compensation and conse-
quently a lower quality of work. 83
The Soviet justice system prides itself on the broad range of services
which are provided by advocates free of charge. 84 As a rule, every Soviet
advocate is obligated by his college to carry a load of pro bono work.
Accordingly, it is reported that out of the seven million oral consultations
given by advocates in 1981, six million were rendered free of charge. 85
Although these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt, they reveal
the amount of time and effort that advocates are pressured to expend
without pay.
81. The signing of the registration card by the advocate finalizes his agreement with the
client whether the latter pays the fee or not. In fact, an advocate may be disciplined for
neglecting his duties after he signed the registration card, even if the payment was not made.
82. See, e.g., UPK RSFSR art. 322.
83. See, e.g., Povysheniye Roli Advokatury v Okazanii Pomoshchi Grazhdanam, supra
note 2, at 97:
[T]he number of cases an advocate has to accept by assignment goes up. At the same
time the quality of work decreases, because after an advocate completes his work, he is
not paid according to the tariff. The payment occurs much later in installments, and
sometimes is not received at all.
(Comments by Stetsovsky.)
84. See, e.g., KONST. SSSR art. 161; The Law, supra note 10, art. I1.
85. See Sovershenstvovaniye Yuridicheskogo Obsluzhivaniya Naseleniya, 4 Sov. Gos. &
PRAvO 74 (1983) (comments by Natruskin, Head of the Advokatura Department of the
Ministry of Justice of the USSR).
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Despite strict government restrictions on advocates' salaries, 86 they
usually earn between two and three hundred rubles a month. 87 After the
obligatory deductions of about 30 percent-usually 25 percent for office
maintenance and 2 to 3 percent for the vacation fund-advocates still take
home a salary significantly higher than the country's average. On the other
hand, advocates, perhaps justifiably, feel that their salaries are not com-
mensurate with the amount of time and effort they have to dedicate to
their work. This situation has resulted in an informal understanding be-
tween advocates and their clients that unrecorded, additional payments
will have to be made in order to stimulate advocates' commitment.
Direct compensation of advocates beyond the rate specified in the In-
struction has become to be known as "mikst," a Russian acronym for
maximum use of the client over the tariff (maksimalnoye ispolzovaniye
klienta sverkh tarifa). Mikst is usually given to an advocate before the
case is tried and thus does not represent a payment for a favorable out-
come. Nonetheless, mikst is widely believed to correlate directly with the
advocate's effort and has become a common method of retaining a desired
advocate.
Although the practice of side payments to Soviet advocates has long
been known in the West, it often was inaccurately characterized as "a
breach of law." 8 8 Even if a western reader might not appreciate the custom
of extralegal payments, it is important to understand that in the context
of total political subordination of the advocate, financial flexibility may
be an important factor of a successful defense. In fact, until 1981, the
most distinctive feature of the advocate's profession was not the oppor-
tunity to receive additional compensation, which is available to and prac-
ticed by all layers of the Soviet society, 89 but the relative impunity with
which mikst were accepted. Under Soviet criminal law the honorarium
paid to advocates cannot technically be labeled as a bribe, and therefore
until 1981 was not criminally punishable. 90 The maximum penalty facing
an advocate receiving mikst used to be disbarment. 9 1
86. It must be acknowledged that Soviet advocates are eligible for state social security
and retirement benefits. See, e.g., RSFSR REGULATION ON THE BAR, supra note 19, art.
20.
87. An advocate's salary is subject to a formal ceiling of 350 rubles a month. See Ad-
vokatura, supra note 3, at 214. If an advocate earns more, the difference is contributed to
the funds of his college.
88. See, e.g., Barry & Berman, supra note 4, at 16.
89. See, e.g., K. SIMIS, THE CORRUPT SOCIETY (1983).
90. See, e.g., UPK RSFSR art. 173, which states that "bribes" are included into the
category of so-called "official crimes," which may be committed only by "an official"-
person in authority-"Dolzhnostnoye litso." UPK RSFSR art. 170 defines "an official" as,
inter alia "a person who permanently or temporarily carries out functions of a state rep-
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In 1981 all Soviet republics eliminated this loophole by amending their
respective criminal codes with articles subjecting to criminal liability in-
dividuals working in service industries for "accepting payments from
citizens for the performance of services included in their office respon-
sibilities." 92 To enforce the implementation of the new statutes, the Plenum
of the Supreme Court of the USSR passed a decree obligatory for all
lower courts. 93 In its decree the Supreme Court specifically emphasized
that the new legislation applied to "all individuals employed in any or-
ganization providing any form of services to the public." 94 Thus, the
government cracked down on the last vestige of independent professional
livelihood. In addition to the prosecution of some advocates, the new law
contributes to a complete political and economic domination of the state
over advocates.
V. Conclusion
The independence of the Soviet bar from the state organs of power is
an illusion that quickly fades once one takes a closer look at the work of
advocates. Yet advocates remain the only profession in the USSR which
is not employed by the state and is not a part of its hierarchy. Within the
confines imposed on its work, advocates perform, if often only perfunc-
torily, the important mission of a guardian to otherwise defenseless peo-
ple. Despite common misgivings, in times of need and want, people still
turn to advocates for support and advice. They still discern in the ad-
vokatura its traditional yearning for pluralism and institutional democracy.
While it exists, even in its circumscribed form, the Soviet advokatura
should be recognized as freedom's refuge in the USSR.
Postcriptum
After the completion of this article, the authors were informed that as
part of a general liberalization of Soviet economic practices undertaken
by M. Gorbachev, several legislative proposals are now under review that
may transform the profession of advocate in the USSR.
The new law on private labor activities, which became effective on May
1, 1987, could introduce the most important of the contemplated changes
resentative." Since the bar is not a part of the state apparatus, advocates do not fall under
the jurisdiction of article 173.
91. Other members of the legal profession, judges and procurators, are subject to criminal
penalties up to the capital punishment. Id. art. 170.
92. See, e.g., UPK RSFSR art. 156(2). Maximum penalty for the violation of this article
is set at three years.
93. See 1 BULL. VERKH. SUDA. SSSR 23 (1984).
94. Id.
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by permitting advocates to practice in their individual capacity, rather
than through colleges of advocates, as is done today. New regulations are
being considered that will remove the current ceiling on advocates' sal-
aries and will revise the fee schedule to allow advocates to charge more
for their services as they become more experienced or skillful. The aims
of the reforms are to provide additional incentives to advocates and to
enable the government to monitor advocates' compensation. If imple-
mented, these innovations would certainly revitalize the advokatura and
make it a more potent factor in Soviet legal and social development.
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